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In this section, the word "peacetime" is used to refer to situations of "normalcy" and not merely to "the absence of war. When pursuing social safety through an effective system of reasonable deterrence and just retribution,  the government automatically is cautioned against treating the accused and the criminals more severely than they deserve to be treated. Sanctions of criminal law, by nature, constitute a radical infringement of fundamental human rights, in a way they fit squarely with the motto: no absolute freedom for the enemies of freedom.
 Consequently, any government that truly values the human dignity of persons under its jurisdiction, is obliged to employ the least intrusive means in the curtailment of the personal liberty of an accused, and provide the imperative safeguards for the accused in its process of crime punishment, to ensure that even persons accused of a crime are given the respect they are owed as humans. While accountability for any criminal offence is indispensable, it should be rendered through a due process of law, and obviously, it is in the nature of procedural guarantees to require states to undertake extensive positive measures to ensure these safeguards, which ultimately call for a highly developed legal system.  Law and philosophy gave birth to the concept of due process as a guarantee against the abusive power of government, which, like fire, could be a "dangerous servant and a fearful master. "
 Shaped in domestic courts, through agreements or controversy as to its scope, the due process of law, undoubtedly embraces the fundamental concep- e terms "deterrence" and "retribution" are at the heart of the discussion regarding punishment for crime, and proponents and theories in favor or against each purpose of punishment are numerous. However, it might be of interest here to note Immanuel Kant's theory on commitment to retribution as distinct from commitment to revenge or vindictiveness, and his opposition to the utilitarian thesis on criminal penalties as deterrence. In his book M E  J, Kant writes, "Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed on a person solely on the ground that he has committed a crime; for a human being can never be confused with the objects of the law of things. ... He must first be found to be deserving of punishment before any consideration can be given to the utility of his punishment…. " J G. M  J C, P  L: A I  J  (), with further discussion of the philosophy of crime and punishment. 
